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6.1 INTRODUCTION

The state is a central concept in political theory and is the pivot around which politics revolves. The word 'state' is derived from Latin which means a situation or state of being (Sartori 1987, p.278). Machiavelli is the first to use the term but did not define what it is. The state is used to convey a historical or philosophical idea, an eternal form of political community, which is a specifically modern phenomenon (Forsyth, 1987, p.503). A state is defined as a political entity that possesses people, territory, a government and sovereignty. A government is a concrete reality of the state, which is an abstraction. Governments change structurally and can be removed without entailing a change in states. A government is the policy deciding body that makes, declares and enforces a law. It can exist and does exist without a state as history and anthropology reveal. An administration is a set of persons and bodies that work under the direction of government to discharge the ordinary public services. A government is the political executive while administration is the permanent executive. Furthermore, the modern state is highly

differentiated, specialised and complex upholding the difference between the private and the public space. As a modern phenomenon the state develops with sovereignty as its distinguishing trait. The concept of sovereignty reinforces the public-private divide and also between one body politic and another. Concurrently with the idea of sovereignty—and partly in opposition to it—grows another idea that distinguishes the state as a modern phenomenon, namely the idea that it is the people as a single entity who rightly decide and constitute the form of rule within the body-politic. This idea was carried further by the American and French Revolutions that established representative institutions and also developed the idea that the proper end of the state is primarily protection of individual rights. The emphasis on 'pursuit of happiness' as proclaimed by the American Revolution and the notions of liberty, equality and fraternity as declared by the French Revolution answer the willing obedience of citizens to political authority. 'The state as a modern phenomenon may, thus, be defined as the institutional representation of the people's will, enabling it to act effectively in both the normal and extreme situation to secure the defence and welfare of the whole and the rights of the parts—together with this very activity itself' (Forsyth, 1987, p.506). The political apparatuses of the modern states are distinct from both rulers and ruled, with supreme jurisdiction over a demarcated territorial area, backed by a claim to a monopoly of coercive power and enjoying a minimum level of support or loyalty from their citizens (Skinner, 1978, pp.349-58; Giddens, 1985, pp.17-31, pp.116-21).

Aims and Objectives

This Unit would enable you to understand

- The nature of the modern state
- The concept and meaning of pluralist state
- The debate on the advanced capitalist state

6.2 NATURE OF THE MODERN STATE: HEGEL

Hegel describes and analyses in detail the nature of the modern state. The state, for him, represents universal altruism synthesising dialectically the elements within the family and the civil society. It functions in a manner that the interests of everyone are furthered and

enhanced. It represents the universal tendencies within the civil society, thus giving rise to the notion of citizenship. It is 'absolutely rational' with a 'substantive will' realising itself through history and is, therefore, eternal, 'This substantive unity was its own motive and absolute end. In this end freedom attained its highest right. This end had the highest right over the individual, whose highest duty in turn is to be a member of the state' (Hegel, cited in Bondurant, 1967, pp.212-13).

Hegel perceives the state as an end in itself; it is Mind realising itself through history. He emphasises the public nature of the state, but does not distinguish between the private and the public spheres. The indispensability of the state is demonstrated by the fact that the individual qualities and potentialities of good life can be realised only through the state. It is divine will, 'in the sense that it is mind present on earth, unfolding itself to be the actual shape and organization of a world'. It is the most sublime of all human institutions, the final culmination which embodies both mind and spirit deriving its strength from a synthesis of the individual interest with that of the state. If there is a conflict between the two, the citizen would identify with those of the state rather than pursue one's own interests. The state is the individual writ large.

Hegel examines the different components of the state like the rule of law, the bureaucracy, and the monarchy. Rule of Law is one of the key formulations in the *Philosophy of Right* (1821). Hegel does not see law as a hindrance to freedom but as a characteristic of freedom. He espouses a broad and a narrow conception of law. In the wide sense, it is one of the instruments for realising social cohesion with law not as a code but one that reflects ethical values which governed cultural life. In this holistic concept, justice is linked to the institutional ordering of the entire society. In the narrow sense, law is linked to positive legal justice. The emphasis on the conventional principles of law makes him reject a conception of higher or natural law, for modern civil codes are becoming more rational and public. Laws must be universally applied based on impersonal and universal values recognising every person as a legal entity entitled to dispose the objects, which are his property. The quantity of that property is a question of

legal indifference, for what matters is the legal authority to acquire, use and exchange property with others based on the principle 'be a person and respect others as persons'.

An interesting aspect of the Hegelian legal system is its lack of the idea of 'command' normally associated with Hobbes. The determining characteristic of a legal norm is its form, which has its basis on practical rationality. The embodiment of a rule is more important than command, for that gives meaning and shape to the rule of law, distinguishing itself from arbitrary power. In an important distinction between command and law, Hegel asserts that commands and orders are specified purposes for identified people, whereas the ambit of law is wider as it addresses a larger and unknown audience and is equally applicable to all within its jurisdiction. Command is from a superior to an inferior while the sanction of law is its rational authority. He rejects the ancient notion, as exemplified by Aristotle, of the purpose of law, being the realisation of human excellence or full development of human capacities and leaves it to the individual's private discretion. In contrast, the modern rule of law consists of a few necessary features that are common to all and is established by the rationality of free individuals. Laws have to be impersonal, rational, intelligent and written for people to conform and consent. He rejects Burke's appeal to tradition and custom as such attitudes result in ill-feeling and hatred for all laws and legislation.

The Universal Class is the bureaucracy, an important component of the Hegelian State, because of its commitment to impartiality. Unlike the other groups of the civil society, who are primarily interested in their own progression or business, the civil service performs the stupendous service of supervising the entire societal apparatus, which Hegel calls the public business. This class of people will not be recruited from the nobility but from the modern middle class symbolising 'the consciousness of right and the developed intelligence of the mass of people'. For this reason, it becomes 'the pillar of the state so far as honesty and intelligence are concerned' (Hegel, 1969, p.190). It is 'knowledge and proof of ability' and not hereditary that is the criterion for recruitment (Ibid, p.190). In developing this philosophy of the civil service, he differentiates the modern constitutional state from the polis and oriental despotism as the bureaucracy is relatively impersonal.

The constitutional state retains its independence from its ruling groups by mechanisms of free institutions and a civil service. The state is not the personal property of an individual or a group and institutional constraints define and limit the power of governments which do not depend on the virtues of statesmen or citizens. This is because modern constitutionalism is suspicious of the abilities of persons in power to control their passions and prevent abuse of power by the rulers. Rule of law and not rule of men reflect the concern of modern societies enabling the modern constitutional state to act impartially. The civil service, like Plato's Guardians, has the interests of the commonwealth in mind. Hegel is categorical that the bureaucracy shall be open to all citizens on the basis of ability and citizenship. They shall have fixed salaries so that they can resist the temptations of civil society. Unlike Plato's guardians, the universal class functions within a framework where the special interests expressed themselves legitimately within the Assembly of Estates and autonomous corporations.

The Monarchy, for Hegel, is a functional requirement of the modern constitution based on separation and division of powers. He goes to the extent of saying that the division of power guarantees freedom. Hegel differentiates between the doctrine of the separation of powers from his own innovative theory of inward differentiation of constitutional powers, dismissing the former as a false doctrine as it supports total autonomy and independence of each functioning category. His model portrays all these categories as mutually supporting aspects of the same totality. His supreme concern is to find a method that secures the unity and integrity of the state. Absolute separation of powers either leads to a stalemate or causes the self-destruction of the state. To avoid this, Hegel prescribes legally differentiated spheres for the crown, the executive and the legislative body, each cooperating with the other to guarantee freedom to its citizens. Interdependence and harmony of the three important branches are the precondition of continuance of the sovereign state with the monarchy at the apex, signifying this unity. Hegel opposes the idea of an elected monarchy or the American-style President, for, even though it may express the popular will, it still represents a small portion of the constitution, while the monarch embodies, in his view, the whole constitution. Hegel's defence of monarchy has to be understood on the basis of his philosophical framework to find out rational

arrangements within the existing institutions. It does not descend into mysticism as Marx thought. He was not interested in finding a philosophic ruler as Plato nor was he trying to depict a future based on human emancipation within a framework of true democracy like Marx. Such ideas were a negation of the entire approach of Hegel, which was based on the assumption that the real is rational and that the immediate present and not the future is the concern. The Hegelian conception influenced British idealist school in the later part of the nineteenth century, especially in the writings of Bosanquet who exalted state authority. Hegel considers the state as a supreme community because of its comprehensive membership and competence as compared to other associations. It is not only physically supreme but also morally preeminent among the social institutions! It is necessarily right and its opinion will prevail when there is a conflict between its opinion and that of a citizen.

6.3 THE PLURALIST STATE

The Pluralist view of state is based on the idea that the government intends to serve mass interest, even though in practice, it may not do so always. The idea that people will collectively determine the laws that should govern them is traced to antiquity yet for a long period of time divine law defined relations between individuals, including who should and how they should be governed (Carnoy, 1983, p.11). With the breakdown of divine law as a result of the rise of capitalism there were important changes in the old social formations by the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In the throes of political changes taking place in England, Hobbes and Locke developed their political ideas. The theory of the liberal state based on individual rights and the State acting in the common good developed.

Schumpeter criticises the aforesaid classical and liberal assumptions by pointing out that there is no such as common good as to different individuals, common good is bound to mean different things. The notion of common good is misleading and dangerous, as there rarely exist an agreement among individuals and groups among ends and even if there is one, there will be disagreements about the means to be employed for the realisation of a given end. In modern societies that are economically and culturally diverse there are

bound to be different notions of common good. Citizens are rarely informed or interested in political issues except for those that affect them directly and economically. Within this critique, Schumpeter comes up with an alternative model of how the modern democratic capitalist state does and should function. Reversing the notion of the classical theory that power resides in the people who chose their representatives to represent their interests—the general will, Schumpeter makes the deciding of issues by the electorate secondary to the election of representatives who are to do the deciding. The electorate is left with the power to decide which set of leaders it wishes to have carry out the decision-making process. Schumpeter compares the power of vote to that of money in the market.

Dahl argues further that even though elections rarely reflect the will of the majority, they are ‘crucial process for insuring that political leaders will be somewhat responsive to the preferences of some ordinary citizens. Power, according to Dahl, still resides in the voters even though this power is not expressed as majority versus minority ‘will’; rather each issue calls forth those voters interested enough in the issue to vote for the politician on the basis of that issue. Political parties help in translating the diverse political demands and help in forming stable governments which equilibrate demand and supply. Both Schumpeter and Dahl argue that individuals function through multiplicity of groups. Dahl points out that power is distributed and shared by many groups in society representing diverse interests and they defend their particular interests through government, creating a proclivity towards ‘competitive equilibrium’ that benefits the citizens in the long run. Citizens exert control over leaders through regular elections and political competition among groups, parties and individuals. The rule by a series of minorities, called as polyarchy function within the boundaries stipulated by consensus with none being able to dominate but all having a space for their manoeuvre and bargaining. This emphasis on consensus is in contrast to Schumpeter’s view of democratic politics, as managed ultimately by competing elite. The competition among groups is the safeguard of democracy, as the latter does not establish the sovereignty of the majority but a rule by ‘multiple minority oppositions’. The more is the presence of competing interest groups, the more secure is democracy.

Marcuse is critical of the democratic pluralist defence of advanced capitalism. He points out that though it is generally conceded that the welfare state has lessened inequalities to a considerable degree by improving standards of the poorer sections, it is acknowledged that far from any indication of the withering away of classes it continues with in-built cleavages giving considerable validity to the Marxist analysis of these societies.

Mills criticises American pluralism by arguing that far from being an independent arbiter of national interest, the state is dominated by the power elite of politicians, military and corporate bosses who shape public policy to suit their own ends. Mills' theory involves a three level gradation of the distribution of power. At the top level are those in command of the major institutional hierarchies of modern society—the executive branch of the national government, the large business corporations and the military establishment controlling political power, means of production and death, respectively reinforcing Eisenhower's conception of the military-industrial complex. The pluralist model of competing interests, according to Mills, applies to the middle level—the semi-organised interplay between interest groups and legislative politics that the pluralists mistakenly assume as the feature of the whole power structure of capitalist state. At the bottom exist the politically fragmented masses (1956, pp.167-68). Mills' account explains the close nexus between economic elite and governmental elite: the corporate rich and 'the political directorate'. He asserts that the growing centralisation of power in the federal executive branch of government is attended by a declining role for professional politicians and a growing number for 'political outsiders' from the corporate world (1956, p.235). Notwithstanding this, Mills declares that it is misleading to consider that 'the political apparatus is merely an extension of the corporate world, or that it had been taken over by the representatives of the corporate rich' (1956, p.170). He tries to distinguish his position from that of what he terms as 'simple Marxian view' that holds economic elite to be the real holders of power and therefore uses the term power elite rather than the 'ruling class' for that implies too much economic determinism (1956, pp.276-77). He also asserts that his analysis is compatible with the Marxist view. Furthermore, he also maintains that the political, military and economic elite are considerably autonomous, often in conflict and rarely act in unity.

Miliband thinks that there is no room for debate about details in Mills' account but the background thesis is reasonably satisfactory. Dahl criticises the analysis on the grounds of insufficient data. He notes that a theory, which cannot be converted to empirical evidence, could not claim to be a scientific theory. The burden of such a proof has to be provided by the theorist and not by his critics. The argument that 'A is more powerful than B' is both ambiguous and meaningless without specificity. No comparison is actually possible when two actors are performing different and not identical functions. Any ideal of political equality is Utopian and the absence of political equality does not mean that there is a ruling elite. Parsons praises the copious data of Mills and agrees that Mills has put it to good use but rejects Mills' claim, as the data is not enough for sufficient empirical grounding. He argues that Mills ignored two very important developments: first, the dynamics of a maturing industrial society; and second, the altered position of the United States in the world in the context of the relative decline of Western Europe, rise of the Soviet power and independence of colonies. The combination of all these factors has led to enormous enhancement of American power in a short time and with their profound repercussions, old political institutions have disappeared. In an essentially non-political society and localism this increase in relative importance of government and its power, has created a great degree of tension in a society where Jeffersonian individualism places primacy in economic values of production. Ignoring these important developments, Mills makes large generalisations on the basis of short-term experience. Parsons argued that the structure of American political leadership was far from settled. Mills provides for a very selective treatment of a complex problem. Without dismissing power to be illegitimate, one should accept it as essential and a desirable component in a highly organised society. However, it is clear that power can be abused and needs many safeguards and controls. In Mills there is no explicit position except that he is partly pre-liberal, anti-capitalist and pro-socialist within the Jeffersonian tradition, but such loose identities are no longer enough for serious model building. Sweezy finds the greatest merit in the book in its graphic description of those who ruled America. He considered it to be an authentic voice of American radicalism. However, he also criticises Mills for blurring class relationships in the light of the dynamics of the class system in areas of the process of co-optation and the loss of high-class status. In short, even the admirers on the left like Miliband and

Sweezy did not consider Mills' account to be rigorously worked out and empirically verifiable thesis of power in contemporary United States.

6.4 DEBATE ON ADVANCED CAPITALIST STATE

Gramsci rightly points out that an advanced state rules by perfecting the ideological apparatus rather than through repressive measures like force and terror. The state consists of two elements: (1) the coercive apparatus comprising of the police, army and judiciary that uphold the authority of the ruling class through force and (2) the other includes various institutions of civil society such as media, church, schools, clubs, parties and trade unions, the instruments of hegemony, the means by which the ruling class secures spontaneous adherence of the rest of the society to comply to its rule. Hegemony allows a ruling group to hold on to power long after it has ceased to be the dominant class. For Gramsci, the tenacity and strength of societal forces within advanced capitalism make it possible for the capitalist class to assert its hegemony. In the process it renders a genuine communist revolution as a virtual impossibility unless carried out in the Leninist manner.

The democratic pluralist view provides the most popular defence of advanced capitalism as a viable and relatively just system. Its major emphasis is that within advanced capitalism there is equality of opportunity, for most, if not all the people, and because of this crucial factor, the concepts of a ruling class, power elite and class politics are largely irrelevant. In these systems 'all the active and legitimate groups in the population can make themselves heard at some crucial stage in the process of decision' (Dahl, 1965, pp.137-38). Since 'the fundamental political problems of the industrial and political citizenship have been solved, conservatives have accepted the welfare state; and the democratic left has recognized that an increase in overall state power carries with it more dangers to freedom than solution to economic problems' (Lipset, 1963, p.443). This theory of classlessness within advanced capitalism has obvious limitations. Though it is generally conceded that the welfare state has lessened inequalities to a considerable degree by improving living standards of the poorer sections, it is acknowledged that far from any indication of withering away of classes, it continues with inbuilt cleavages. In other words, the Marxist analysis of these societies still retains validity to a very considerable degree.

In recent times, one of the most penetrating class analyses of the welfare state has emerged in the writings of Ralph Miliband, who in his *The State in Capitalist Society* (1969) makes a detailed critique of the pluralist view by asserting the superiority of the Marxist analysis. He begins by examining the concepts of ruling class or the power elite, which the pluralists totally ignore. Advanced capitalist countries are highly industrialised and a large portion of their activity is under private ownership and control. Miliband points out that there is state intervention, of varying degrees, in the economic life. Their economic base is identical, resulting in notable similarities within their social structure and class distribution. A relatively small number of people continue to own a very large and disproportionate share of wealth deriving their incomes from ownership. This class is the ruling class in the Marxist sense. Despite 'all the instances of growing or achieved 'classlessness' . . . the proletarian condition remains a hard and basic fact in these societies, in the work process, in the levels of income, in opportunities or the lack of them, in the whole social definition of existence' (Miliband, 1969, p.16).

These affluent societies also carry with them large sections of people who live in misery. Managerial capitalism is not a selfless neutral institution but maintained definite class interests. They appeared social in character but exist largely for private purposes. The social origins of this managerial class are similar to people with large incomes and ownership of property. The elite recruitment is mostly hereditary. Education is very important to rise in the ladder, though the elite institutions are usually accessible to upper and middle classes. The working class students do not get better jobs. The differences among the dominant classes are confined within a given ideological framework. The property owners control the state system. For instance, a very small percentage of the American army officers come from the working class background. It is the same case in Sweden and Japan. The main purpose of the government is to further the interests of capitalism for it, 'genuinely believed in the virtues of capitalism, and . . . have accepted it as far superior to any possible alternative economic and social system' (Ibid, p.70). Contrary to the general belief, the higher civil service is also not neutral. The military maintains close relationships with large-scale business houses. The government appoints judges who, in turn, appoint conservative judges. All these factors combine to create an

imperfect competition. In different ways this process is legitimised. For instance, the bourgeois political parties are in a position to spend more money than the working class. Miliband also points out that the most significant political fact of advanced capitalism 'is the continued existence in them of private and ever more concentrated economic power. As a result of that power, the owners and controllers in whose hands it lies, enjoy a massive preponderance in society, in the political system, and in the determination of the state's policies and actions' (Ibid, p.265). The basic fact in these societies is that unequal economic power produces unequal political power.

It is the capitalist context of generalised inequality in which the state operates which basically determines its policies and actions. The prevalent view is that the state in these societies can be and indeed mostly is the agent of a 'democratic' social order, with no inherent bias towards any class or group; and that its occasional lapse from 'impartiality' must be ascribed to some accidental factor external to its 'real' nature. But this too is a fundamental misconception; the state in these class societies is primarily and inevitably the guardian and protector of the economic interests which are dominant in them. Its 'real' purpose and mission is to ensure their continued predominance, not to prevent it (Ibid, pp.265-66).

Miliband's instrumentalist view argues that the capitalists use the state as a means for domination in society. The Structuralists like Althusser (1969) stress the ideological and structural mechanisms that help the ruling class maintain itself in power using both force and consent. Elaborating on Althusser's basic formulations, Poulantaz (1973) relates it to the major function of capitalism, namely the reproduction of the capitalist society in its totality. The state along with maintaining the political interest of the ruling class also performs the functions of ensuring cohesion and equilibrium in society in a manner that blurs class divisions. As a result, social relations appear competitive and individual-based. Any notion of class and class struggle disappears in that situation. The competitive party system concealed the contradictions, factions and disunity. It does not allow hegemony of any particular class, including the bourgeoisie. Since the state is not the instrument, as Miliband assumes, of a dominant class, it is a relatively autonomous and a stabilising factor. The Structuralist view, like the instrumentalist one, does not deal with

the mechanism of change or the essential reasons for the continuance of the capitalist state.

Marcuse accepts the fact of inequalities in advanced capitalism and its irrationalities; yet he concludes that there is no probable escape from it because there is some rationality in these irrationalities which are cherished and valued by all, irrespective of class and status. One of these is the prevailing false consciousness in an overwhelming number which allows disguised violence of the state to continue making the state look legitimate to the majority of the people.

6.5 EASTON ON POLITICAL SYSTEM

Easton rejects the use of the term state both historically and in its contemporary use. It is not an analytical tool and comes into frequent use only since the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and developing fully in the nineteenth century. In between, it served two important functions: (a) universalistic claims of the Medieval Church and (b) rivalries and competitions of local feudal lords. To combat these two challenges “the state concept became a crucial myth in the struggle for national unity and sovereignty. It is both vague and imprecise because of the many conflicting claims and interpretations which cannot provide the basic tools of a scientific analysis”.

The concept of the state has no utility for empirical work and “its importance lies largely in the field of practical politics as an instrument to achieve national cohesion rather than in the area of thoughtful analysis”. The use of the concept of the state has three serious limitations: (a) it does not allow any distinctiveness of the political science analysis from the other social sciences; (b) it does not help in working out a satisfactory definition and (c) it concentrates on particular episodes rather than emphasising on the general characteristics.

The basic limitation of the concept of the state is that it concentrates on the specific and the particular rather than on the general framework which will allow study of a wide variety of institutions. It does not allow study of formations where the state does not exist. The state is just one form of political institutions and not the only one as social

anthropology has established. The universality of the political is restricted by the state and the fact remains that the state originates only in some specific historical setting.

In this effort at broadening the meaning of political participation, Easton includes all the political activities that affect the entire policy making process, the cumulative effect of all these factors forms the political system. Political system, with its unique characteristics, would be different from other systems like the economic system. These concepts become crucial in comprehending this differentiation and identification, policy, authority and society. Policy means allocation of values. It has two parts, formulation and execution of a policy. Policy is much wider than a formal or legal decision-making process. Political science is not concerned with all value allocations but only “with authoritative allocations or policies”. The distinctiveness of political research lies in identifying the values that influence and affect authoritative allocation.

The concept of authority is linked to obedience. The societal basis of authority is the notional concept of universal application, though a particular policy normally affects a small segment of the entire society. The data for political research is broadly differentiated between the situational and the psychological. Within the situational data there are three different categories: (1) the physical environment (2) the non-human organic environment and (3) the social environment as a consequence of social interaction. The basic distinction between the situational and psychological data leads to the adoption of the idea of political behaviour, which makes the departure from the traditional approach, which ignores this distinction. However, moral framework is also essential for a constructive approach both for rational enquiry and in formulating a systematic theory. For elaborating on this moral framework of research, Easton makes a critical assessment of value premises of traditional political theory based on historical research.

6.6 CONCLUSION

The wide diversity that is reflected in the various theories and practices of the state indicate the extreme complexity of dealing with this important concept. Today the debate is within the framework of liberal democracy, between the individualists and

communitarians. Owing to a larger consensus between the pluralists and the Marxists, a convergence in broad terms is also visible in the theories of the state, with emphasis both on structure (Marxist-elitist preference) and agency (the pluralist emphasis). However, one major inadequacy of the theories of the state, more in the case of pluralists and less in that of the Marxists, has been its lack of comprehension of the international impact of globalisation, which makes these theories locally dated. In this age of globalisation, a theory of the state must reflect both, on its relative autonomy and subordination in a world where most of the decisions are emerging from centre, beyond the jurisdictions and control of the individual nation state.

6.7 SUMMARY

The state is a central concept in political theory and is the pivot around which politics revolves. The word ‘state’ is derived from Latin which means a situation or state of being. Machiavelli is the first to use the term but did not define what it is. The state is used to convey a historical or philosophical idea, an eternal form of political community, which is a specifically modern phenomenon. The wide diversity that is reflected in various theories and practices of the state indicate the extreme complexity of dealing with this important concept. Today the debate is within the framework of liberal democracy, between the individualists and communitarians. Owing to a larger consensus between the pluralists and the Marxists, a convergence in broad terms is also visible in the theories of the state, with emphasis both on structure (Marxist-elitist preference) and agency (the pluralist emphasis). However, one major inadequacy of the theories of the state has been its lack of comprehension of the international impact of globalisation, which makes these theories locally dated. Today’s theory of the state must reflect both on its relative autonomy and subordination in a world where most of the decisions are emerging from centre beyond the jurisdictions and control of the individual nation state.

6.8 TERMINAL QUESTIONS

1. Define the state and what are the distinguishing features of the modern state?
2. Critically dissect Hegel’s analysis of the state
3. Explain the debate on the advanced capitalist state. What are its criticisms?

4. What is a pluralist state? Explain with reference to the views of Schumpeter and Dahl.

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