UNIT 4   SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS

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4.0. OBJECTIVES

“Contemplating all the men of the world, who come together in society to work, struggle and better themselves, cannot but please you more than any other being” – Antonio Gramsci, in a letter from prison to his son Dleio. It is a fact that human person is not island and we are social and political creature in the words of Aristotle. One of the characters of human beings is ‘social,’ ‘relational’ and ‘cultural’ of his/her existence. At all levels (cosmic, social, religious, etc) we are related to things, persons and events outside us, and as we journey along the pathway of life, we let them contribute to the moulding of our being. Living in social groups is an essential characteristic of humans. It is the transcendental condition of humans that enables them to be related to others. Sociality and individuality are not opposite poles. They are necessarily related to each other. To be social one has to be individual and vice versa. An individual can stand face to face with one another and thus by standing they constitute a community or society. Society becomes a crowd/collectivity when everyone becomes no one. Sociality has to be gradually lived and developed. It is a constant ideal and real. This ideal has to be appropriated by existential struggling.

In order to have meaningful existence in the society, we have to have right knowledge of the society. The social institutions play important role in forming the society. They have a variety of significant customs and habits accumulated over a period of time. The social institutions provide certain enduring and accepted forms of procedure governing the relations between individuals and groups. Thus this Unit pictures the role of social institutions which give the habitual way of living together which has been sanctioned, systematized and established by the authorities. We must know that these institutions are the wheels on which human society marches on. In every society people create social institutions to meet their basic needs of survival. Hence a study of social institutions is important. A social institution is a stable cluster of norms, values, structures and roles. So we discuss various salient accounts of social institutions. Accounts emanating from sociological theory as well as philosophy are also mentioned in this unit. A teleological account of social institutions is presented. The normative character of social institutions is outlined in general terms. This normativity is multi-faceted. For example, it includes the human goods realised by institutions as well as the rights and duties that attach to institutional roles. Finally we deal with the more specific normative issue of the justice of social institutions.
4.1. INTRODUCTION

The term “social institution” refers to complex social forms that reproduce themselves such as political institutions like, governments, state, the family, human languages, universities, hospitals, economic institutions like business corporations, and legal systems. Jonathan H. Turner, a professor of sociology at University of California defines it as “a complex of positions, roles, norms and values lodged in particular types of social structures and organising relatively stable patterns of human activity with respect to fundamental problems in producing life-sustaining resources, in reproducing individuals, and in sustaining viable societal structures within a given environment.” Again, Anthony Giddens, a British Sociologist who is renowned for his theory of structuralism, holds that “Institutions by definition are the more enduring features of social life.” He goes on to list as institutional orders, modes of discourse, political institutions, economic institutions and legal institutions. The contemporary philosopher of social science, a distinguished philosopher and psychologist from New Zealand Rom Harre follows the theoretical sociologists in offering this kind of definition: “An institution was defined as an interlocking double-structure of persons-as-role-holders or office-bearers and the like, and of social practices involving both expressive and practical aims and outcomes.”

Theory of social institutions is not concern of sociologists alone but it has philosophical interest as well. One important reason stems from the normative concerns of philosophers. For instance John Rawls (1921 – 2002) an American philosopher and a leading figure in moral and political philosophy has developed elaborate normative theories concerning the principles of justice that ought to govern social institutions. There are five major institutions that are conventionally identified. 1. Economic institutions which serve to produce and distribute goods and services, 2. Political institutions that regulate the use of and access of, power, 3. Stratification institutions determine the distribution of positions and resources, 4. Kinship institutions deal with marriage, the family and the socialization of the young, 5. Cultural institutions are concerned with religious, scientific and artistic activities.

4.2. ACCOUNTS OF SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS

Any account of social institutions must begin by informally marking off social institutions from other social forms. Unfortunately in ordinary language the terms “institutions” and “social institutions” are used to refer to a miscellany of social forms, including conventions, rituals, organisation and systems. Moreover, there are a variety of theoretical accounts of institutions, including sociological as well as philosophical ones. Indeed, many of these accounts of what are referred to as institutions are not accounts of the same phenomena; they are at best accounts of overlapping fields of social phenomena.

To start with, social institutions need to be distinguished from less complex social forms such as conventions, social norms, roles and rituals. The latter are among the constitutive elements of institutions. Social institutions also need to be distinguished from more complex and more complete social entities, such as societies or cultures, of which any given institution is typically a constitutive element. A society, for example, is more complete than an institution since a society – at least as traditionally understood – is more or less self-sufficient in terms of human resources, whereas an institution is not. Thus, arguably, for an entity to be a society it must sexually reproduce its membership, it must have its own structure, territory, culture, language and
educational system, and it must provide for itself economically and – at least in principle – politically independence.

Social institutions are often organisations. Moreover, many institutions are systems of organisations. For example, capitalism is a particular kind of economic institution, and in modern times capitalism consists in large part in specific organisational forms—including multi-national corporations—organised into a system. Further, some institutions are meta-institutions; they are institutions that organise other institutions. For example, governments are meta-institutions. The institutional end or function of a government consists in large part in organising other institutions (both individually and collectively); thus governments regulate and coordinate economic systems, educational institutions, police and military organisations and so on largely by way of legislation.

Nevertheless, some institutions are not organisations, or systems of organisations, and do not require organisations. For example, the English language is an institution, but not an organisation. Moreover, it would be possible for a language to exist independently of any organisations specifically concerned with language. An institution that is not an organisation or system of organisations comprises a relatively specific type of agent-to-agent interactive activity, e.g. communication or economic exchange, that involves: (i) differentiated actions, e.g. communication involves speaking and hearing/understanding, economic exchange involves buying and selling, that are; (ii) performed repeatedly and by multiple agents; (iii) in compliance with a structured unitary system of conventions, e.g. linguistic conventions, monetary conventions, and social norms, e.g. truth-telling, property rights.

4.3. GENERAL PROPERTIES OF SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS

In our discussion on social institutions, there are four salient properties, namely, structure, function, culture and sanctions. Roughly speaking, an institution that is an organisation or system of organisations consists of an embodied structure of differentiated roles. These roles are defined in terms of tasks, and rules regulating the performance of those tasks. Moreover, there is a degree of interdependence between these roles, such that the performance of the constitutive tasks of one role cannot be undertaken, or cannot be undertaken except with great difficulty, unless the tasks constitutive of some other role or roles in the structure have been undertaken or are being undertaken. Further, these roles are often related to one another hierarchically, and hence involve different levels of status and degrees of authority. Finally, on teleological and functional accounts, these roles are related to one another in part in virtue of their contribution to the end(s) or function(s) of the institution; and the realisation of these ends or function normally involves interaction between the institutional actors in question and external non-institutional actors. The constitutive roles of an institution and their relations to one another can be referred to as the structure of the institution.

Note that on this conception of institutions as embodied structures of roles and associated rules, the nature of any institution at a given time will to some extent reflect the personal character of different role occupants, especially influential role occupants. Moreover, institutions in this sense are dynamic, evolving entities, as such, they have a history, the diachronic structure of a narrative and a partially open-ended future. Apart from the formal and usually explicitly stated, or defined, tasks and rules, there is an important implicit and informal dimension of an institution
roughly describable as institutional culture. This notion comprises the informal attitudes, values, norms, and the ethos or “spirit” which pervades an institution. Culture in this sense determines much of the activity of the members of that institution, or at least the manner in which that activity is undertaken. There can be competing cultures within a single organisation; the culture comprised of attitudes and norms that are aligned to the formal and official complex of tasks and rules might compete with an informal and “unofficial” culture that is adhered to by a substantial sub-element of the organisation’s membership.

It is sometimes claimed that in addition to structure, function and culture, social institutions necessarily involve sanctions. It is uncontroversial that social institutions involve informal sanctions, such as moral disapproval following on non-conformity to institutional norms. However, some theorists argue that formal sanctions, such as punishment, are a necessary feature of institutions. Formal sanctions are certainly a feature of many institutions, notably legal systems; however, they do not seem to be a feature of all institutions. Consider, for example, an elaborate and longstanding system of informal economic exchange between members of different societies that have no common system of laws or enforced rules.

Check Your Progress I

Note: Use the space provided for your answer

1) How is Social Institution distinguished from Society?

2) How are Social Institutions treated as Organisations and Institutions?

3) What are the salient properties of Social Institutions?

4.4. THE MAIN THEORETICAL ACCOUNTS OF SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS

Theoretical accounts of institutions identify institutions with relatively simple social forms especially conventions, social norms or rules. At one level this is merely a verbal dispute such
simpler forms could simply be termed “institutions”. However, at another level the dispute is not merely verbal, since what we are calling “institutions” would on such a view consist simply of sets of conventions, social norms or rules. These accounts are called atomistic theories of institutions. Here the “atom” itself typically consists of the actions of individual human persons, e.g. conventions as regularities in action that solve coordination problems. The individual agents are not themselves defined in terms of institutional forms, such as institutional roles. Hence atomistic theories of institutions tend to go hand in glove with atomistic theories of all collective entities, e.g. a society consists of an aggregate of individual human persons. Moreover, atomistic theories tend to identify the individual agent as the locus of moral value. On this kind of view, social forms, including social institutions, have moral value only derivatively, i.e. only in so far as they contribute to the prior needs or other requirements of individual agents.

The regularities in action or rules made use of in such atomistic accounts of institutions cannot simply be individual regularities in action or individual rules for action; rather there must be interdependence of action such that, for example, agent A only performs action x, if other agents, B and C do likewise. Moreover, some account of the interdependence of action in question is called for, e.g. that it is not the sort of interdependence of action involved in conflict situations. By contrast with atomistic accounts of social institutions, holistic accounts stress the inter-relationships of institutions (structure) and their contribution to larger and more complete social complexes, especially societies. Thus according to Barry Barnes, “Functionalist theories in the social sciences seek to describe, to understand and in most cases to explain the orderliness and stability of entire social systems. In so far as they treat individuals, the treatment comes after and emerges from analysis of the system as a whole. Functionalist theories move from an understanding of the whole to an understanding of the parts of that whole, whereas individualism proceeds in the opposite direction.”

A system of moral is always the affair of a group and can operate only if the group protects them by its authority. It is made up of rules which govern individuals, which compel them to act in such and such a way, and which impose limits to their inclinations and forbid them to go beyond. Now there is only one moral power - moral, and hence common to all - which stands above the individual and which can legitimately make laws for him, and that is collective power. To the extent the individual is left to his own devices and freed from all social constraint, he is unfettered by all moral constraint. It is not possible for professional ethics to escape this fundamental condition of any system of morals. Since, then, the society as a whole feels no concern in professional ethics, it is imperative that there be special groups in the society, within which these morals may be evolved, and whose business it is to see that they are observed.

Holistic accounts of social institutions often invoke the terminology of internal and external relations. An internal relation is one that is definitive of, or in some way essential to, the entity it is a relation of; by contrast, external relations are not in this way essential. Thus being married to someone is an internal relation of spouses; if a man is a husband then necessarily he stands in the relation of being married to someone else. Likewise, if someone is a judge in a court of law then necessarily he stands in an adjudicative relationship to defendants. Evidently, many institutional roles are possessed of, and therefore in part defined by, their internal relations to other institutional roles.
Thus we have discussed atomistic and holistic accounts of social institutions. However, there is a third possibility, namely, molecularist accounts. Roughly speaking, a molecularist account of an institution would not seek to reduce the institution to simpler atomic forms, such as conventions; nor would it seek to define an institution in terms of its relationships with other institutions and its contribution to the larger societal whole. Rather, each institution would be analogous to a molecule; it would have constitutive elements (“atoms”) but also have its own structure and unity. Moreover, on this conception each social institution would have a degree of independence vis-à-vis other institutions and the society at large; on the other hand, the set of institutions might itself under certain conditions form a unitary system of sorts, e.g. a contemporary liberal democratic nation-state comprised of a number of semi-autonomous public and private institutions functioning in the context of the meta-institution of government.

We can find here that atomistic and holistic accounts of institutions have been presented and found to be problematic. Atomistic accounts focus on the elements of institutions, and thereby fail to provide an adequate account of the structure or “glue” that might transform a mere set of conventions or rules into an institution. Holistic accounts focus on the whole societies of which institutions are typically a part, and seek to explain the part in terms of the whole; in so doing they fail to offer an account of institutions that sufficiently respects their distinctive character and relative ontological independence of society conceived as a unitary whole. Let us now turn to an account of institutions that treats institutions, so to speak, on their own terms. The account in question is consistent with institutional molecularism, broadly conceived.

4.5. A TELEOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF INSTITUTIONS

Teleology finds its etymology in the Greek word ‘telos’ which means “end”, and logos, “science”. It refers to final purpose and as a theory it explains and justifies values in reference to some final purpose or good. It is a theory that derives duty or moral obligation from what is good or desirable as an end to be achieved. The central concept in the teleological account of social institutions is that of joint action. Joint actions consist of the intentional individual actions of a number of agents directed to the realisation of a collective end. A collective end is a species of individual end; it is an end possessed by each individual involved in the joint action. However it is an end, which is not realised by the action of any one of the individuals; the actions of all or most realise the end. Examples of joint action are two people lifting a table together, and two men jointly pushing a car.

Collective ends can be unconsciously pursued, and have not necessarily been at any time explicitly formulated in the minds of those pursuing them; collective ends can be implicit in the behaviour and attitudes of agents without ceasing to be ends as such. Further, in the case of a collective end pursued over a long period of time, e.g. by members of an institution over generations, the collective end can be latent at a specific point in time, i.e. it is not actually being pursued, explicitly or implicitly, at that point in time. However, it does not thereby cease to be an end of that institution—which is to say, of those persons—even at those times when it is not being pursued. Social norms are regularities that are also norms; agents believe that they have a duty to conform or that they otherwise ought to conform. Such norms include ones respecting and enforcing rights. Here the “ought” is not that of mere instrumental rationality; it is not simply a matter of believing that one ought to conform because it serves one’s purpose. Some
conventions and most rules are also norms in this strong sense. For example, the convention and the law to drive on the left is a norm; people feel that they ought to conform. This strong sense of “ought” includes—but is not exhausted by—the so called moral “ought”.

Organisations consist of a formal structure of interlocking roles. These roles can be defined in terms of tasks, procedures and conventions. Moreover, unlike social groups, organisations are individuated by the kind of activity that they undertake, and also by their characteristic ends. So we have governments, universities, business corporations, armies, and so on. Perhaps governments have as an end or goal the ordering and leading of societies, universities the end of discovering and disseminating knowledge, and so on. Here it is important to reiterate that these ends are, firstly, collective ends and, secondly, often the latent and/or implicit (collective) ends of individual institutional actors.

A further defining feature of organisations is that organisational action typically consists in, what has elsewhere been termed, a layered structure of joint actions. One illustration of the notion of a layered structure of joint actions is an armed force fighting a battle. Suppose at an organisation level a number of “actions” are severally necessary and jointly sufficient to achieve some collective end. Thus the “actions” of the mortar squad destroying enemy gun emplacements, the flight of military planes providing air-cover and the infantry platoon taking and holding the ground might be severally necessary and jointly sufficient to achieve the collective end of defeating the enemy; as such these “actions” constitute a joint action. This can be consistently held while maintaining that organisations, as well as conventions, are a pervasive and necessary feature of human life, being indispensable instruments for realising collective ends. Collective ends are a species of individual ends; but merely being an end is in itself neither, say, morally good nor morally bad, any more than being an intention or a belief are in themselves morally good or morally bad.

It should also be noted that the social norms governing the roles and role structures of organisations are both formal and informal. If formal, then they are typically enshrined in explicit rules, regulations and laws, including laws of contract. For example, an employee not only believes that he ought to undertake certain tasks and not others, but these tasks are explicitly set forth in his contract of employment. As mentioned above, informal social norms to a greater or lesser extent comprise the culture of an organisation. Organisations with the above detailed normative dimension are social institutions. So institutions are often organisations, and many systems of organisations are also institutions. Teleological accounts can be either descriptive or normative. Slavery is a morally objectionable social institution mobilising physical force and ideology in the economic interests of the slave-owners at the expense of the human rights of the slaves; in the case of many such institutions the real end of the institution might need to be masked by the ideology, if the institution is to survive. Perhaps many asylums are likewise morally objectionable institutions. On a descriptive teleological account, such institutions will turn out to be institutions; their nature as institutions will not be denied. However, in the context of such a descriptive account of institutions the question of their morally objectionable institutional activities and ends will simply not arise. However, by the lights of a normative teleological account of social institutions, the end(s) of any given institution to be some social or human good and there ought to be moral constraints on institutional activities. Accordingly, on a normative teleological account a morally objectionable institution such as slavery will turn out to
be defective *qua institution*. Nevertheless, on the normative account such morally objectionable collectivities are institutions; the normative teleological account needs to be consistent with the descriptive teleological account.

### Check Your Progress II

**Note:** Use the space provided for your answer

1) How do atomistic theories explain social institutions?

2) How do holistic and molecularist accounts stress on the role of Social Institutions?

3) What is the central concept in the teleological account of social institutions?

4) What is the nature-teleological accounts of social institutions?

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### 4.6. Normative Character of Social Institutions

Normative theory involves arriving at moral standards that regulate right and wrong conduct. In a sense, it is a search for an ideal litmus test of proper behaviour. The Golden Rule is an example of a normative theory that establishes a *single principle* against which we judge all actions. Other normative theories focus on a set of foundational principles, or a set of good character traits. Normative theories seek to provide action-guides; procedures for answering the practical question (What ought I to do?”). The key assumption in normative theory is that there is only *one* ultimate criterion of moral conduct, whether it is a single rule or a set of principles.

Social institutions have a multi-faceted normative dimension. Moral categories that are deeply implicated in various social institutions include human rights and duties, contract based rights and obligations and rights and duties derived from the production and consumption of collective goods. Take police institutions. Police are typically engaged in protecting someone from being deprived of their human right to life or liberty, or their institutional right to property. Moreover, a
distinctive feature of policing is the use, or threatened use, of coercive force. Here the institution of the police is different from other institutions that are either not principally concerned with protecting moral rights, or that do not necessarily rely on coercion in the service of moral rights.

There is relationship between social institutions and human rights. However, there are a range of moral rights that might be termed “institutional moral rights”. These are moral rights that depend in part on rights generating properties possessed by human beings qua human beings, but also in part on membership of a community or of a morally legitimate institution, or occupancy of a morally legitimate institutional role. Such institutional moral rights include the right to vote and to stand for political office, the right of legislators to enact legislation, of judges to make binding judgments, of police to arrest offenders, and of patients to sue doctors for negligence. Here we need to distinguish between: (a) institutional rights that embody human rights in institutional settings, and therefore depend in part on rights generating properties that human beings possess as human beings (these are institutional moral rights), and; (b) institutional rights that do not embody human rights in institutional settings. The right to vote and the right to stand for office embody the human right to autonomy in the institutional setting of the state; hence to make a law to exclude certain people from having a vote or standing for office is to violate a moral right. But the right to make the next move in a game of chess, but not three spaces side wards, is entirely dependent on the rules of chess; if the rules had been different, e.g. each player must make two consecutive moves or pawns can move side wards, then the rights that players have would be entirely different. In other words these rights that chess players have are mere institutional rights; they depend entirely on the rules of the “institution” of the game of chess. Likewise, parking rights, such as reserved spaces and one hour parking spaces in universities are mere institutional rights, as opposed to institutional moral rights.

Let us now focus on institutional moral rights. There are at least two species of institutional (moral) rights. There are individual institutional (moral) rights and there are joint moral rights. Joint moral rights are moral rights that attach to individual persons, but do so jointly. For example, in the context of some institution of property rights the joint owners of a piece of land might have a joint right to exclude would-be trespassers. Having explored in general terms the normative character of social institutions let us now turn in the final section of this entry to a more specific normative aspect of institutions, namely their conformity or lack of it with principles of distributive justice.

4.7. SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
Justice is an important aspect of many, if not all, social institutions. Market economies, salary and wage structures, and tax systems, judicial systems, prisons, and so on are all in part to be evaluated in terms of their compliance with principles of justice. Here it is important to distinguish the concept of justice from, on the one hand, the related concept of a right—especially a human right—and from goods, such as well-being and utility, on the other hand. Self-evidently, well-being is not the same thing as justice. However, there is a tendency to conflate justice and rights. Nevertheless, arguably the concepts are distinct; or at least justice in a narrow relational sense should be distinguished from the concept of a right. Genocide, for example, is a violation of human rights—specifically, the right to life—but it is not necessarily, or at least principally, an act of injustice in a relational sense. A person’s rights can be violated,
irrespective of whether or not another - or indeed everyone - has suffered a rights violation. However, injustice in the relational sense entails unfairness as between persons or groups; injustice in this sense consists in the fact that someone has suffered or benefited but others have not. Although the concept of a right and the concept of justice are distinct, violations of rights are typically acts of injustice (and vice-versa).

Moreover, the concept of justice is itself multi-dimensional. Penal justice (sometimes referred to as retributive justice), for example, concerns the punishment of offenders for their legal and/or moral offences, and is to be distinguished from distributive justice. Thus it is a principle of penal justice, but not distributive justice, that the guilty be punished and the innocent go free. Distributive justice is essentially a relational phenomenon to do with the comparative distribution of benefits and burdens as between individuals or groups, including the distribution of rights and duties but not restricted to the distribution of rights and duties, e.g. the injustice of excluding blacks (but not whites) from voting in elections to determine the national government in apartheid South Africa or of lower wages being paid to women than those paid to men for the same work.

Distributive justice is an important aspect of most, if not all, social institutions; the role occupants of most institutions are the recipients and providers of benefits, e.g. wages, consumer products, and the bearers of burdens, e.g. allocated tasks and, accordingly, are subject to principles of distributive justice. Moreover, arguably some institutions, perhaps governments, have as one of their defining ends or functions, to ensure conformity to principles of distributive justice in the wider society. However, distributive justice does not appear to be a defining feature, end or function of all social institutions. Communication systems, such as human languages, are arguably defined in part in terms of the end of truth, but not in terms of justice; hence, a communicative system would cease to be a communication system if its participants never attempted to communicate the truth, but not if its participants failed to respect principles of distributive justice, e.g. in terms of the number of occasions on which particular speakers were allowed to speak.

In conclusion, a final point about liberal democratic governments and distributive justice. There is at least one important and uncontroversial principle of distributive justice that arises in the context of collective enterprises (joint action); namely that, other things being equal, the benefits produced by joint actions should flow back to those who performed the joint action. Let us assume that inevitably citizens of a given polity participate in collective enterprises; whereas this is not necessarily the case for individuals who are not citizens of the same polity. (In the contemporary globalising world this assumption is increasingly implausible; but let us grant it for the sake of argument.) Surely this principle of distributive justice, if any, should be enforced by governments in relation to their own citizens but not in relation to non-citizens. Perhaps, at any rate, one key test of this proposition is whether or not individuals would be morally entitled to enforce such a principle of distributive justice in the absence of government. If the answer is in the affirmative, i.e. individuals have a “natural” right to enforce this principle of distributive justice, then presumably governments have a right to enforce it; after all, as we have seen above, according to liberal democratic theory individuals relinquish to government whatever pre-existing moral rights to enforcement they might have had.
What if the answer to our question is in the negative; does it follow that the government has no moral right to enforce this principle of distributive justice? Not necessarily. For one thing enforcement of such a principle of distributive justice is not necessarily the violation of a human right; if it were, this would be a moral constraint on governmental action in this regard. For another thing, in the context of a liberal democratic state citizens can make legitimate joint decisions—via their representative governments—that are simply unavailable to them when they are functioning as lone individuals; and one of these joint decisions might well be to enforce such a principle of distributive justice in their society on the grounds that it is a weighty moral principle the enforcement of which is morally required.

Now consider—as is in fact the case—a world in which many joint economic enterprises are in fact trans-societal, e.g. a multi-national corporation. Naturally, the citizens of different societies (polities)—or at least their representative governments—might also make a joint decision to (jointly) enforce this principle of distributive justice in relation to trans-societal joint economic enterprises involving citizens from both polities, e.g. wages in a poor society would need to reflect the contribution of the wage-earner to the overall benefits produced by the multi-national corporation. And if the citizens are committed on moral grounds to the enforcement of this principle of distributive justice in relation to intra-societal economic interactions, it is difficult to see why they should not be likewise committed to it in trans-societal economic interactions.

Check Your Progress III
Note: Use the space provided for your answer

1) What are the Multidimensional aspects of Justice?

2) How does Distributive Justice play a role in Social Institutions?

4.9 LET US SUM UP

In this unit gave the formation of social institutions through various philosophical theories and their implications in the ethical field.

4.10 KEY WORDS

Teleology: It means end and refers to final purpose and as a theory explains values in reference to some final purpose.
Social Institution: They are simple social forms, conventions and rules, in addition to structure, function and culture of society.

4.9. FURTHER READINGS AND REFERENCES


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